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WHAT REALLY HAPPENS IN CHILD SUPPORT CASES:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ESTABLISHMENT AND
ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS
IN THE DENVER DISTRICT COURT
By Lucy MARSH YEE*
Child support is, or should be, of significant concern to society. It has
been estimated that approximately seventy percent of the children in this
country live in households which do not include both of the child's natural
parents.' Therefore, a high percentage of the children in the United States
theoretically should be entitled to some child support. Establishment and
enforcement of child support orders, however, do not seem to have a high
priority in our judicial system, nor are establishment and enforcement han-
dled consistently.
The following three orders for child support were made by the same
judge: father A pays $60 per month to support two children from a net
monthly income of $450, father B pays $50 per month to support two chil-
dren from a net monthly income of $900, father C pays $120 per month to
support two children from a net monthly income of $450. Why does the
father with the highest monthly income pay the least? Why does father C,
with exactly the same income as father A, pay twice as much?
During 1978, a study was undertaken of child support orders entered by
the District Court in Denver, Colorado, to determine what orders are en-
tered for child support, what factors cause the dramatic variation in these
orders, how well child support orders are being enforced, and what means of
enforcement seem to be most effective. The study is based on a scientifically
selected random sample of cases2 scheduled for hearing in the Denver Dis-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law, and Deputy District
Attorney, City and County of Denver, Colorado. B.A. 1963, Smith College. J.D. 1966, Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School.
The author wishes to express particular thanks to three law students, Ruth Bennett, Mona
Goodwin, and Robert Truhlar, for help with this study. Ruth and Mona spent a tremendous
number of hours going through the files of the Denver District Court and the Denver District
Attorney's Office to collect the requisite data. Bob was invaluable in his efficient, thoughtful
coordination and tabulation of the data to get it into usable form. Special thanks are also due
to Dale Tooley, Denver District Attorney, and David R. Costello, Chief Deputy District Attor-
ney, Child Support Division, for permission to use the files of the Denver District Attorney's
Office for this study. Any errors in this article are entirely the responsibility of the author.
1. Interview with Margaret Perkins, M.S.W., N.A.S.W., L.S.W. 11 (1979).
2. It was the goal of the author to include 150 cases in which a new support order was
entered and 150 cases in which a case was set for hearing on a contempt citation. Because of
various data collection problems, the final data is based upon 135 new support order cases and
152 contempt citation cases. Between January I and December 31, 1977, the Denver District
Attorney's Office handled 574 cases for new support orders. There was an attempt to include in
the study every fourth support order case in which the respondent was served and the case was
set for court hearing. Using a random number table, we began with the seventh case in the time
frame of the study. Since 266 contempt citations were handled by the Denver District Attor-
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trict Court during the period from January 1, 1977, to September 30, 1978,
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA).3 Al-
though the scope of the study is limited, it is believed that the results are
representative of child support orders in general.
4
ney's Office in 1977, an attempt was made to include every other case in which a citation had
been set for hearing, starting with the random number nine.
3. Only cases brought under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (here-
inafter cited as URESA) are included. URESA is used primarily to enforce duties of support
owed to minor children, but it is available for use on behalf of anyone to whom a duty of
support is owed; e.g., a former spouse or a child over the age of 21 who is incompetent and
therefore entitled to continued support. URESA is not used when both parents of a child live
within the same county. Therefore, many support orders entered as part of a divorce never
become part of the URESA system. Each URESA order is a new order and "does not nullify
and is not nullified by a support order made by" another court of the same state or of a different
state. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-5-132 (1973). Thus, there is no guarantee that a support order
entered in a divorce proceeding when both parties are present will be followed when a new
support order is entered under URESA. Usually the URESA order is sought because the origi-
nal order is not being obeyed.
URESA has been adopted, either in the original or the revised version, by all 50 states.
The Colorado URESA is found at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-5-101 to 143 (1973 & Supp. 1978).
Both the original version and the revised version provide for substantially the same procedures:
a person who has legal custody of a child, or a welfare department making payments for the
benefit of the child, files a complaint for support in the child's local court. Normally the person
seeking support on behalf of the child is assisted in filing the complaint by the local district
attorney. See id. § 14-5-113. The assistance of a district attorney at any stage of the proceedings
usually is provided without charge to the petitioner, as it is in Denver. Once an action for
support has been commenced, the local court, if it determines that a duty of support probably is
imposable on the person named in the complaint, forwards the action to the jurisdiction in
which that person may be found. In other words, a mother in Pennsylvania, seeking support for
her children, may file a URESA action in her local court with the help of her local district
attorney. The action will then be sent to the district court of the jurisdiction in which the father
of the children resides, Denver, Colorado, in this example. The Denver District Attorney will
then assist the court by securing service on the father. The Denver District Attorney will repre-
sent the petitioner at the hearing to establish a support order and at all enforcement proceed-
ings thereafter required. Support payments made by the respondent will be paid to the clerk of
the Denver District Court and forwarded by him to the proper authorities in Pennsylvania,
eventually reaching the petitioner, the mother of the children.
Child support orders under URESA are entered and enforced by the same judges who
enter and enforce other child support orders, but the fact that a father resides in a different state
from his children is undoubtedly significant in the results. A father who rarely sees his children
will be less likely to maintain a close personal involvement with them and probably will be less
likely to pay. However, this may be offset by the fact that a father who rarely sees the mother of
his children may be less likely to get into bitter battles with her. A father's anger toward the
mother of his children undoubtedly has an effect on his willingness to pay child support.
A Wisconsin study on compliance with child support orders found that "after one year only
38 percent of the fathers were in full compliance and 42 percent were in total non-compliance,
i.e., they paid nothing. But at the 10th year compliance had dropped to 13 percent and total
non-compliance had risen to 79 percent." Conti, Child Support.- His, Her, or Their Responsih/lites?
25 DE PAUL L. REV. 707, 718 n.62 (1976). Thus, absence from the home and distance from the
children seem to have an impact on payment of child support. It was not unusual in URESA
cases for a father to explain that he had not paid support primarily because he did not approve
of the present conduct of his former wife, even though such approval or disapproval is legally
irrelevant to the obligation to pay child support.
4. During the period of this study, all URESA cases were assigned to the two domestic
relations judges in the Denver District Court. These were the same judges who also heard
privately initiated cases for dissolution of marriage, child support, child custody, and similar
matters on a regular basis. The system currently used in the Denver District Court has been
modified to some extent. New petitions for a support order are now heard initially by either of
two designated referees. The referee then recommends entry of a particular support order, and
the order is actually signed by one of the regular domestic relations judges. Thus future studies
should include an analysis of the impact of the referees, as well as the judges, on establishment
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In any study of child support orders, variation would be expected both
as to the amount of support ordered and as to the methods of enforcement
because the needs and resources of the particular people involved vary. In
addition, child support cases, like any others, are affected by the relative skill
and ability of the lawyers and judges who handle the case.
The impact of the style and ability of individual attorneys, however, is
somewhat diminished in the present study by the fact that all of the cases
were handled by one of two attorneys assigned to the Child Support Division
of the Denver District Attorney's Office.5 Thus, only two attorneys were
involved in representing the petitioners.
Similarly, only two judges, who were assigned to domestic relations,
were involved in a large percentage of the cases (86% for establishment of
support orders and 72.8% for enforcement). The remainder of the cases were
decided by nine other judges. The variation among the orders of the judges
involved, particularly those of the two primary judges, indicates that the
personality, beliefs, and attitude of the particular judge who hears a case
have a distinct impact on the outcome of the case. Again, since most of the
data originated from the orders of only two judges, a fairly valid picture of
the cases handled by those two judges may emerge, but not enough cases
were included in the study from each of the nine other judges to ascertain a
consistent pattern for all judges-if there is one.
So, recognizing the limits of the study, this article will discuss the data
secured. Part One discusses the establishment of child support orders, the
amounts awarded, and the factors which influenced the size of the orders.
Part Two summarizes the family and welfare consequences of those support
orders. Part Three deals with the enforcement of child support orders.
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS
A. The Amount Awarded
Child support orders entered by the Denver District Court during 1977-
78 ranged from a low of zero for two children to highs of $640 per month for
five children ($128 per child) and $225 per month for one child. The aver-
age order was $84.53 per month,6 but that number is misleading. Some or-
ders were entered for the benefit of several children. Other orders were
entered for the benefit of only one child. The average order per child was
$47.15 per month.7
of support orders. All contempt citations in URESA cases continue to be heard by the regular
domestic relations judges.
5. Although two attorneys handled all the child support cases for the Denver District
Attorney, only one of them was full time. The other, the author, worked only ten hours per
week. The author handled litigation of all cases scheduled to be heard before one of the two
domestic relations judges, but did almost no work on settlements and stipulations reached prior
to the day of trial.
6. This number was determined simply by adding together the amount of the order from
all 135 cases, including the cases which appeared twice in the sample and the cases in which no
order was entered, and dividing that sum by 135.
7. This number was determined by dividing the total of all orders, as found by the




Perhaps the average amount ordered per child still does not accurately
portray the situation. It may be true that two cannot live as cheaply as one,
yet the cost of raising two children in the same household is simply not twice
the cost of raising one child. Clothes are usually handed down. Car pay-
ments are totally unaffected by the presence of a second child. Babysitters
usually charge no more for additional children. Rent and utilities, though
they may increase somewhat as family size goes up, simply do not double or
even increase by one-third when a second child is added to a family.
8
It was beyond the scope of this study to ascertain just how much more
per month should be paid for the second or third child in a family. How-
ever, two sources of financial data were available for comparison with the
amounts awarded by the Denver District Court. Welfare payments to a
family with dependent children increase somewhat with the number of chil-
dren in the family. Table 1 sets forth an example of such payments. In
addition, in 1973 the late Judge William Burnett of the Denver District
Court promulgated guidelines to be considered in establishing child support
orders. The guidelines were published in the Family Law Newsletter of The
Colorado Lawyer9 with a strong admonition from the Family Law Council
that the guidelines should not be used to replace individual discretion in
particular cases. For ease of comparison, Judge Burnett's guidelines have
been converted to a monthly basis,' 0 using 4.3 weeks per month. The con-
verted monthly guidelines are set forth in Table 2 and will hereafter be re-
ferred to as the guidelines. These guidelines are based on the net income of
the person subject to a court order for support, as are all income figures
mentioned in this study. The average monthly payment actually ordered
when there was one child covered by the support order was $78.06 per
month." t The average monthly payment when there were two children cov-
ered by the order was $97.28.12 This is an increase of 23.2% for the second
child. The guidelines at a comparable net income level provide for an in-
crease of roughly 86.7% for the second child, yet they provide for only a .20%
incremental increase for the third child. This study did not include enough
families with three children, however, to make a valid statistical comparison
of the increase ordered by the courts when there were three children.'
3
Further refinement of this data may be necessary to portray accurately
the amount of child support ordered. The calculations in the preceding par-
agraph included all cases which were part of the random sample, but forty-
8. A third source is available for comparison: child support guidelines published by the
Maricopa Co. Bar Assoc., Maricopa Co., Ariz. See 8 COLO. LAW. 1032, 1036 (1979). It was not
used in this study.
9. 5 COLO. LAW. 45, 46 (1976).
10. Only the guidelines for one, two, and three children were converted to monthly figures,
as few cases in this study included four or more children. See note 13 bifia.
11. This number was secured by using all cases in which one child was involved, excluding
duplicate cases.
12. The amount of $97.28 was figured by the same method indicated in note 11 supra.
13. In fact, there were only 10 families in the study with 3 children, 5 families with 4
children, 2 families with 5 children, and 3 families with 6 children. Of these 20 families, only 12
were involved in cases in which a support order was actually entered. Disregarding cases in
which no order was entered, we are left with only 7 families with 3 children, 3 families with 4
children, 2 families with 5 children, and no families with 6 children.
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nine of these cases, 36.3%, resulted in the entry of no support order. At first
glance it would seem that these cases simply should not have been included
in the study, but the information provided by them is too important to ig-
nore. The possible reasons for the "no order" rate will be analyzed later.'
4
At this time, however, it is sufficient to emphasize that 36.3% of the total
number of cases studied resulted in no order. 15 Since an order requiring
support payments may later have been obtained in many of those same
cases, it seems proper when analyzing the average amount of support or-
dered to disregard the cases in which no order was entered.
Returning to the average amount ordered per case and per child, and
considering only those cases in which some support order was entered, we
find that the average order per case was $126.68;16 the average order when
there was one child in the family was $95.30; and the average order when
there were two children in the family was $122.39 or $61.20 per child. In
other words, the average support order for two children was 28.4% higher
than the average support order for one child. Under the guidelines, the sup-
port obligation would be expected to increase by 86.7% for a second child. If
the guidelines were applied, a father who paid a total of $95 for one child
would be expected to pay approximately $180 for two children. Clearly the
gap between the guidelines and what actually happens in support order
cases is dramatic. Whether a second child actually causes household ex-
penses to increase by 28.4% or by 86.7% is beyond the scope of this paper.
The fact remains that in Denver the average increase for the second child
when some order is entered is 28.4%.
However, averages per se are not particularly enlightening. Too much
has been left out. We need to know the details of specific support orders and
the factors which have caused the particular orders to be made. Then we
should be interested in ascertaining the variation or deviation from the "av-
erage" which exists in particular cases.
B. Income of the Respondent
It would seem reasonable that the single most important factor in deter-
mining the size of a support order should be the income of the parent
charged with the duty of support. Although mothers and fathers have an
equal duty to support their children, and although URESA specifically ap-
14. See section D of the text, Allomeys, nta.
15. This should not surprise judges who have been involved in trials of URESA cases.
Perhaps it is no worse than the comparable rate in other cases, but it is a sad commentary of the
efficiency of the court system. Considerable time and effort was expended by court personnel,
attorneys, and parties, while no results were obtained. Each case had been set by the District
Attorney's Office for hearing, the respondent had been served, court personnel had checked out
the court file and secured a computer printout of all past payments made by the respondent
through the Denver District Court. The case had appeared on the docket on the hearing date,
thus crowding out other possible cases. Each case probably had been called by the judge and
both a minute order and a written order prepared, all of which showed that nothing particu-
larly significant had occurred on the trial date. Subsequently, the files had to be returned to the
proper storage areas.
16. The average order per case is based on all cases, including those in which there were
four or five children.
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plies to and is enforced against both parents, no single case appeared in this
study in which a support order had been entered against a woman.' 7 Since
all orders in this study were imposed upon fathers, this article will refer to
the parent subject to a support order either as father or respondent.
It should be mentioned at this time that the income of the mother is not
one of the factors which should be used to explain the variation in orders. In
the first place, in slightly more than 60% of the cases studied, the children
were on welfare, indicating clearly the mother's inability to support the chil-
dren. More importantly, under URESA the only factors to be considered by
the court are the needs of the children and the ability of the non-custodial
parent to pay support. 18 Normally it would be expected that children whose
father makes $2,000 per month would receive more child support than chil-
dren whose father earns $400 per month. The children of a father with more
money are simply expected to be able to enjoy a higher standard of living.
There is no reason to penalize children whose parents both work by not al-
lowing them to receive appropriate support from both parents, so the sup-
port obligation owed by one parent should not be decreased by the earning
ability of the other parent. In fact, the law requires that such a reduction
not take place.' 9
This article now turns to an examination of the relationship between
the income of the respondent and the size of the support order entered.
The net income of the "average" father included in the study, using
only those cases in which some order was entered, was $659.03 per month.
20
The "average" father would have paid 14.5% of his income ($95.30) for the
17. The writer was involved in attempting to enforce some support orders entered against
mothers, but these cases were rare. This is probably a reflection of the fact that, at the time of
this study, it was still true that in most cases a woman was granted custody of her children when
the parents were divorced. The mother, therefore, would have the responsibility of day-to-day
care of the children, but she would not be ordered to make additional cash payments-to her-
self, in essence-for the benefit of the children. For interesting Colorado cases on the custody
issue, see Catron v. Catron, 577 P.2d 322 (Colo. App. 1978); Menne v. Menne, 572 P.2d 472
(Colo. 1977).
18. Vigil v. Vigil, 30 Colo. App. 452, 453-54, 494 P.2d 609, 611 (1972). See also County of
Clearwater v. Petrash, 589 P.2d 1370 (Colo. App. 1979).
19. Vigil v. Vigil, 30 Colo. App. 452, 453-54, 494 P.2d 609, 611 (1972). See also COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-5-125 (1973): "If the responding court finds a duty of support, it may order
the obligor to furnish support or reimbursement therefore and subject the property of the obli-
gor to the order." There is no provision in the URESA statute which states that the financial
resources of the custodial parent are to be taken into account in setting the amount of the
support order, as contrasted with the Colorado version of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage
Act which specifies that the financial resources of the custodial parent are to be considered. Id.
at § 14-10-115(l)(b). The fact that an order of support entered as part of a divorce or dissolu-
tion proceeding is modified or nullified will have no effect on the URESA order. See id. at § 14-
5-132; note 3 supra. In other words, a URESA support order is entered after consideration of
different factors than those considered in establishing a support order as part of a dissolution
proceeding. All payments made under any order, however, are credited to payments due under
the URESA order. Id.
20. The average income was figured by adding the income of all the fathers whose income
was known and dividing by the number of fathers. This computation did not include six of the
cases used to determine the average order entered, since in these cases the amount of the order
was available, but not the income of the father. In two of the omitted cases, the father's income




support of one child. Based on the actual support orders entered by the
courts, an "average" father of two children would have paid 18.6% of his
income ($122.39) for the support of his two children.
By contrast, if the guidelines had been followed, a father with a net
monthly income of $635 would have paid 20% of his income ($127) for one
child and 34% of his income ($215.90) for two children. So two children
actually receive very nearly what the guidelines suggest for one child. The
actual average order for two children is $93.51 per month less than the
guidelines suggest-a difference of $1,122.12 per year. To put it another
way, the average father paid only 56.7% of the amount recommended by the
guidelines to support two children.
So much for the "averages." The facts of the real, individual cases are
considerably more striking. As indicated at the beginning of this article, one
father with a net monthly income of $450 was ordered to pay $120 per
month (27% of his income) to support his two children. Another father net-
ting $900 per month was ordered to pay only $50 per month total (6% of his
income) to support two children. Both orders were entered by the same
judge after a full court hearing. Neither order was the product of a stipula-
tion between the parties. Clearly, there is dramatic variation in the orders of
the specific judge involved.
When we look beyond the orders of any particular judge to consider all
the support orders included in the study, there are even more dramatic con-
trasts. A father with a total net income of $250 per month, for example, was
ordered to pay $60 per month for one child (24% of his income). A father
making $840 per month was ordered to pay only $50 per month-SO less
(only 6% of his income-to support his one child).
It is difficult to decide which are the most extreme cases. It could be, at
the top of the percentage spectrum, the case in which a father with net in-
come of $625 was ordered to pay $300, or 48% of his income, to support
three children, or it could be the case in which a father with $450 per month
was ordered to pay $150, or 33.3% of his income, to support only one child.
Possibly, no one of these cases at the top seems extreme, since it would not be
surprising to spend $300 a month to raise three children or $150 a month to
raise only one child. The guidelines suggested approximately $258 per
month for the support of three children from an income of $625 per month
and $77 per month for one child from an income of $450. The $300 per
month order was slightly above the guidelines; the $150 per month order was
nearly twice what the guidelines suggested.
The orders at the low end of the percentage spectrum are harder to
understand. Fathers with $900 and $874 incomes, respectively, were each
ordered to pay $50 per month total to support two children (5.6% and 5.7%,
respectively). Fathers with incomes of $1,342 and $1,053, respectively, were
each ordered to pay $100 per month for one child (7.5% and 9.5% respec-
tively). Fathers with incomes of $840 and $800 were each ordered to pay $50
per month for one child (6% and 6.3% respectively). In contrast, a man with




In an attempt to isolate the determinative factors that cause this varia-
tion, five additional aspects of each case were studied: the particular judge
involved, the presence or absence of a private attorney for the respondent,
the pattern of conduct by the district attorney's office, and the other rela-
tively fixed living expenses of the respondent, and the season of the year in
which the support order was entered.
C. Individual Judges
First, cases were broken down as to the judge who signed each particu-
lar order. Included were only those cases in which some order had been
entered and in which at least the number of children and the father's income
were known.
Table 3 sets forth the orders entered by Judge A;2 1 Table 4 lists the
orders made by Judge B; Table 5 is the record of Judge C; and Table 6
indicates the type of orders made by the other judges who handled cases in
which the minimum data was available. 22 Judges A and B, the judges regu-
larly assigned to domestic relations during most of the time frame included
in the study, handled 43.5% and 40.6% of these cases, respectively. In other
words, these two judges accounted for 84.1% of the cases. Judge C, who had
extensive prior experience in the domestic relations division, accounted for
only 7.2% of the cases. The other 8.7% of the cases were assigned to several
judges, each of whom handled few such cases.
At a glance, it is clear that the range of variation in the orders of Judge
A and Judge B is far greater than the range of variation indicated by the
table for Judge C. This may be explained simply by the fact that more cases
from each of these two judges were available for comparison. As more cases
are studied, the chances of finding particuarly high orders or particularly
low orders would be expected to increase. Perhaps the variation can be ex-
plained simply on that basis.
Another explanation also is possible. It may be that Judge A and Judge
B, assigned full time to domestic relations during the period of the study,
had developed attitudes toward child support cases that were different than
those of their brethren who were assigned to other divisions. Some, albeit
slim, support is found for this theory by closer analysis of Table 6. Of the
five judges included in Table 6, two were new judges just entering into full
time assignment to the Domestic Relations Division. Those two judges, even
during their first few months on the bench, were exposed to more child sup-
port cases than most other judges would see in a full year.23 Thus, although
21. Although the data in the study was collected and analyzed by using the names of the
actual judges involved, it would serve no useful purpose to use the names of the judges in this
article. The article is intended to ascertain how the system itself works without regard to the
personality of any particular individuals involved.
22. Normally, cases were handled by judges other than those assigned to domestic relations
only when the domestic relations docket became so crowded on a particular day that cases were
sent to other judges who had indicated a willingness to help.
23. The study includes few support orders from the new domestic relations judges, F and
H, because of the time frame necessary to gather sufficient data. It was only necessary to in-
clude new support orders entered between Jan. 1, 1977 and Jan. 1, 1978. The contempt citation
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the study itself would not indicate it, Judges F and H really should be
counted as judges assigned full time to domestic relations. If their orders are
removed from Table 6, the range of variation in orders becomes even
smaller: from 25.6% of income to 41.7% of income, from a low order of $125
per month to a high order of $200 per month. Thus, if full time domestic
relations judges are compared with judges from other divisions, 24 it is appar-
ent that there are far more variations in the orders of full time domestic
relations judges than in the orders of other judges. This may be simply a
quirk of the small number of cases examined that were decided by non-do-
mestic relations judges, but it could indicate something more.
Whenever possible, the deputy district attorneys who tried child sup-
port cases would mention to the presiding judge the amount of support
which would be ordered under the guidelines. Clearly, if the guidelines had
been followed, there would be no significant variation in the percentage of
income ordered. It would be roughly 20% for one child and roughly 34% for
two children. The non-domestic relations judges were probably made aware
of the guidelines by the deputy district attorney. They may have felt some-
what bound by the guidelines; or they may have tended to rely rather heav-
ily on the deputy district attorney's presentation in the belief that the deputy
had, in fact, been exposed to far more child support cases;25 or they may
have been less sensitive to the factors which cause individual orders to vary
so widely and to deviate so far from the guidelines.
Domestic relations judges may be less inclined to rely on the experience
of the district attorney, since the judge himself has heard an equal if not
greater number of child support cases. Because of his familiarity with the
field, a domestic relations judge may be less hesitant to strike out on his own
and make an order which seems appropriate to him in a particular case,
regardless of the orders which have been entered in other cases.
If the data for this aspect of the study is valid and not simply a fluke
caused by the small size of the sample, then the results are significant in
considering a separate "Family Court." Presumably, if there is more varia-
tion in orders by judges who are assigned to domestic relations (usually for
one year) than in the orders of other judges, there could be still more varia-
tion in the orders ofjudges who were assigned to a "Family Court" full time,
year after year.26 Another study would be necessary to verify whether, in
fact, there is more variation by judges assigned to domestic relations. Then
the policy issue could be faced as to whether such variation is desirable.
data, however, includes more cases handled by Judges F and H, because it was necessary to
include contempt cases through Sept. 1978.
24. Judges from other divisions include Judge C (Table 5) and Judges D, E, and G (Table
6).
25. Judges who handled few domestic relations cases were more likely to ask for the recom-
mendation of the deputy district attorney, as were judges newly assigned to domestic relations.
After a judge felt more experienced in the area, however, he was less likely to ask or permit the
deputy district attorney to make recommendations. A judge who worked with the same deputy
week after week seemed to develop a need to maintain a separation between the bench and the
District Attorney's Office-which was probably entirely appropriate.
26. If that thesis is true, the results obtained in a special "Family Court" might be even less
predictable than the results now obtained in the domestic relations division.
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Let us return to the records of the individual judges, particularly Judge
A and Judge B. A glance at Tables 3 and 4 shows that for both judges there
is tremendous variation in the percentage of income required to be paid for
child support. It seems impossible to believe, after examining Tables 3 and
4, that the net income of the respondent was the crucial factor in determin-
ing the amount of child support. About the most that can be said is that no
individual order was likely to be less than $50 per month, no matter how
many children were involved. No order in Judge B's courtroom was likely to
be higher than $150 per month, regardless of the number of children in-
cluded in the order. Orders in Judge A's courtroom ranged as high as $300
when three children were involved, but were unlikely to be more than $150
when only two children were included. The average order and the average
percentage of income were both somewhat higher when signed by Judge A
instead of Judge B.
27
Perhaps the explanation for the variation in orders lies behind the data
presented in Tables 3 and 4. Not all of these orders resulted from full trials.
In fact, the majority of them did not. As in any other field of litigation, a
settlement often was reached prior to the court date, so the order entered was
the signed stipulation of the parties.28 Such settlements were designated in
the study as signed stipulations (hereinafter simply called stipulations).
Many other cases were settled in the halls of the courthouse just a few mo-
ments before trial. Such settlements are designated as agreements at court.
Only a minority of cases actually went to trial and were decided by the
judge. When Tables 3 and 4 are revised to eliminate all stipulations and
agreements at court, the results are as indicated in Tables 7 and 8.
Comparing Tables 7 and 8 with Tables 3 and 4, it is immediately obvi-
ous that the range of variation has, in fact, narrowed significantly. What has
actually happened in decisions made by both judges is that the top part of
the range has been eliminated. In fact, though he may have approved orders
as high as 48% or $300, Judge A has never himself made an order higher
than 18.8% or $150. Similarly, although Judge B approved orders as high as
33.3% or $225, he never made an order higher than 26.6% or $125. Thus,
there is less variation among orders actually decided by the judges after a
hearing in court, and the orders made after a hearing are significantly lower
than the full range of orders approved by the same judges.
Several factors may be causes of this result. One of them may be the
presence or absence of an attorney representing the respondent. In addition,
the presence or absence of an attorney may have a significant impact on
other aspects of the case. Let us, therefore, turn to an analysis of the impact
on a child support case of the representation of the father by a private attor-
ney.
27. The average for Judge A was $130.07 per month or 20.5% of income; the average for
Judge B was $94.43 per month or 16.3% of income.
28. Such orders typically arose when the respondent or his attorney contacted the District
Attorney's Office well before the court date and worked out an agreement, which was reduced
to writing; signed by the respondent, his attorney, if any, and the deputy district attorney; and




The absence of attorneys, in the cases represented in Tables 7 and 8 is
striking. In only one of the fifteen cases was the respondent represented by
an attorney. The same general pattern holds true for all child support cases
in this study. Clearly, private attorneys do not normally litigate child sup-
port cases.
29
Both the lay public and lawyers, unfortunately, would expect to find
that lawyers stall the cases. That is indeed the fact. In 35.7% of the cases in
the study in which nothing happened except a continuance to another date,
the respondent was represented by an attorney. This is particularly signifi-
cant considering the fact that private attorneys were involved in only 29% of
the total cases studied. Thus, private attorneys, handling 29% of the cases,
accounted for 35.7% of the total continuances. Many of these continuances
were not the first made in a particular case. On the average, a case which
was newly continued when picked up in the study already had been contin-
ued .75 times before if the respondent was not represented by an attorney. If
the case was handled by an attorney, it had been continued .88 times before.
So, to the surprise of no one, the study confirmed that cases are more likely
to be continued from one trial date to another when the respondent is repre-
sented by an attorney.
Certainly attorneys do more for their clients than postpone court dates.
They also keep the amount of the orders down somewhat, particularly when
orders are analyzed as a percentage of the respondent's income. The average
income of a respondent represented by an attorney was $780.80 per month.
The average income of a respondent not represented by an attorney was
$640.66 per month. 30 In those cases in which a support order was actually
entered, however, the income gap between respondents with an attorney and
respondents without an attorney widened: the average income of a respon-
dent with an attorney was $800.93 per month, while the average income of
an unrepresented respondent was $617.88 per month. 3 1 The average sup-
29. There are probably two basic reasons for this. First, attorneys are more familiar with
the possibility of settlement on the courthouse steps and are better able to catch the attention of
the deputy during the moments before trial. Attorneys, almost in a flock at times, follow the
deputy around during the hour or so before the cases are heard, insisting on being given the
opportunity to negotiate. Although any deputy would be willing to negotiate with a respondent
appearing pro se, the individual respondents usually are not quite so persistent as attorneys.
The second reason attorneys try fewer cases is probably a reflection of their case loads and
their familiarity with the judges and deputies involved. Basically, an attorney usually cannot
afford to litigate a URESA case: his fee simply is not large enough to justify that much court
time. In addition, knowing the judge and D.A. involved, the respondent's attorney is in good
position to make a realistic offer which is likely to be accepted.
30. This figure was obtained by using all 135 cases included in the study, except the one
case in which it was not determined whether the respondent had been represented by an attor-
ney. The average income of respondents represented by attorneys was computed using all cases
in which an attorney was involved. If the same case appeared more than once in the study, the
data for him was used only once.
31. This may indicate that attorneys are relatively successful in accepting only those clients
who will be able to pay, or it may mean that only those respondents who think that they could
pay an attorney seek a lawyer's services. A respondent with a net income of $1,000 per month,
however, chose not to be represented by an attorney, while a respondent with a net income of
$445 per month was represented by an attorney.
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port order for a respondent with an attorney was $116.09 per month (14.5%
of income) while the average order for the unrepresented respondent was
$132.56 per month (21.5% of income). Again, this finding should not sur-
prise either lawyers or laymen, but it should be of concern.
What is somewhat surprising is the number of cases handled by an at-
torney in which data on the respondent's income was not available either in
the court file or the file of the district attorney. In 41% ofthe cases handledby an
attorney, there was no data bi thefiles on the respondent's income. In only 5.2% of the
cases in which the respondent was unrepresented did the files lack income
data.32 Are the experienced child support private attorneys consciously
avoiding having the court or the district attorney know the exact monthly
income of their clients? Does an offer of $100 or $150 per month satisfy a
busy judge or district attorney without regard to what the father might
really be able to pay or the standard of living the child might have enjoyed if
the parents' marriage had not ended?
33
If attorneys basically do not litigate, what do they do in child support
cases, besides stall and keep the amount of the order down? The obvious
answer is that they negotiate settlements, which they seem to do quite effec-
tively. Seventy-six percent of the cases handled by an attorney in which
some order was entered resulted in a negotiated settlement in contrast with
68.6% of such cases not handled by an attorney. Thirty-two percent of the
cases handled by an attorney in which some order was entered resulted from
a signed stipulation, meaning that the parties did not have to appear in
court. 34 By contrast, 59% of the non-attorney cases were settled by signed
stipulation.3 5 The percentages for orders resulting from agreement of the
parties at court show a dramatic reversal. Forty-four percent of the attor-
ney-handled cases in which some order was entered resulted from agree-
ments at court, whereas only 9.8% of the non-attorney cases resulted in such
agreements.
36
Attorneys seem to do relatively well for their clients on these agree-
ments. No respondents who had private attorneys entered into stipulations
in which the support payment exceeded the guidelines. Twelve and one-half
32. Financial affidavits are always sent to the respondent, along with the summons and
subpoena, in hopes that the affidavits will actually be filled out in compliance with the local
court rules and thus expedite matters at trial.
33. An experienced domestic relations attorney probably has a very good idea of what
amount actually may be ordered by a particular judge and what number is likely to seem
acceptable to the particular deputy involved. See note 29 supra.
34. Signed stipulations are used only when there is sufficient time for mailing between the
date on which the agreement is reached and the court date.
35. One factor which is important in this context is that a district attorney virtually never
accepted an oral agreement from a respondent. There was simply no way in which a deputy
could determine whether a man whom he had met once would keep his word. Therefore, as a
matter of policy, all negotiations were reduced to writing and signed by both parties before they
were considered to be agreements.
On the other hand, most attorneys involved in domestic relations work had established a
reputation of credibility with the D.A. If the attorney and the deputy agreed to particular
terms orally, on the day of trial or before, the attorney would not later attempt to change the
terms; consequently, more stipulations were simply read into the record on the court date, thus
appearing in the study as agreements at court.
36. The same factors mentioned in notes 29 and 35 supra were relevant here.
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percent of the stipulations were below the guidelines by less than 10%; 12.5%
were more than 10% below the guidelines. In 62.5% of the cases, the respon-
dents' incomes were unknown. The comparable percentages for unrepre-
sented respondents were 5.6% more than 10% above the guidelines, 13.9%
above the guidelines by less than 10%, 8.3% within 1% of the guidelines,
22.2% less than 10% below the guidelines, 41.7% more than 10% below the
guidelines, and 8.3% with income unknown.
37
The fact that the percentages for represented fathers are so similar in
various categories may result from the fact that too few cases appeared in
this category to make the data valid. Nevertheless, it is significant that the
only time a father signed a stipulation above the guidelines is when he was
not represented by an attorney. Perhaps those fathers who are basically will-
ing to pay substantial child support simply come to the district attorney's
office prepared to commit themselves to a high support order without put-
ting up a fight.
Of all the cases in which agreements were reached at court, 64.5% were
cases in which the respondent had an attorney.38 Of these, none was above
the guidelines, 39 10% were within 1% of the guidelines, 50% were below the
guidelines by less than 10%, and 30% were more than 10% below the guide-
lines. In the remaining 10% of the cases, the respondents' incomes were un-
known. Comparable data for agreements made by unrepresented fathers
indicate 16.7% were more than 10% above the guidelines, no agreements
were within 1% of the guidelines, 16.7% were less than 10% below the guide-
lines, 16.7% were more than 10% below the guidelines, and 33.2% with in-
come data unknown.
Again the percentages clearly show that there is not enough data on
cases settled at court without an attorney to make the results particularly
valuable. As with settlements prior to court, however, only unrepresented
fathers reached agreements for amounts above the guidelines.
In summary, attorneys stalled cases, avoided litigation, frequently failed
to disclose income data, settled 32% of their cases prior to court and 44% at
court, kept the orders somewhat lower than the guidelines, and never allowed
their clients to end up with an order above the guidelines. The presence of an
attorney did, in part, determine how high a support order will be, but the
range in attorney-handled cases was from 6% to 31.6% of a father's net in-
come, with a low of $40 per month for two children and a high of $300 per
month for two children. The presence of an attorney, therefore, does not
explain why particular support orders are entered.
37. The guidelines per se are not controlling, but they do provide a means of comparing
the payments ordered at various income levels.
38. Seventeen cases were settled at court: II by the respondent's attorney and 6 by the
respondent himself.
39. In one of the I I cases, a respondent who reportedly had no income was ordered to pay
$100 per month to support two children. Obviously this amount would be considerably above
the guidelines. The order was probably entered because the parties believed the respondent's
earning capacity was sufficient to enable him to pay $100. Not knowing what that earning
capacity was considered to be, it was felt that inclusion of data from this case would distort the
accuracy of the remaining data.
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E. The D'str'ct Attome
All URESA cases tried in the Denver District Court are handled by the
office of the Denver District Attorney.40 The district attorney is involved in
every case from beginning to end. A respondent who is served with a sum-
mons and subpoena also receives a letter at the time of service suggesting
that he contact the district attorney to discuss possible settlement and advis-
ing him that he may bring a lawyer of his choice with him. 4' In 41.9% of the
cases in which some order was entered, the respondent and the district attor-
ney reached an agreement prior to the court date, which was then reduced to
a signed stipulation to be approved by the court. In the writer's experience,
not once was a signed stipulation disapproved by the judge,42 so the agree-
ment between the district attorney and the respondent became binding.
When respondents were represented by an attorney in negotiating with
the district attorney, neither the signed stipulations nor the agreements at
court were above the guidelines. When respondents are not represented by
an attorney, the orders may exceed the guidelines. The presence of an op-
posing attorney seemed to keep the district attorney somewhat in check.
It is clear, then, that what the district attorney does when an opposing
lawyer is present should be distinguished from what happens when there is
no opposing attorney. The average order for a signed stipulation when an
opposing attorney was present was $105 per month or 13.2% of the respon-
dent's income. When there was no attorney, the average order resulting
from a signed stipulation was $143.31 or 22.9% of respondent's income.
4 3
The range of support amount when the respondent was represented was 6%
to 31.6% or $40 to $300 to support two children. Without an attorney, re-
spondents paid 5.7% to 52.9% of his income; or $50 to $250 to support two
children, or $640 to support five children. The range of variation when
there was a signed stipulation, even when a respondent is represented, is thus
decisively larger than the comparable range of orders entered by regular
child support judges in a contested hearing, whether or not an opposing at-
torney is present (the ranges for Judge A and Judge B were 10.5% to 18.6%
and 5.6% to 26.6%, respectively). The range of variation found in orders
pursuant to a stipulation reached without an opposing attorney present is
larger than any other range found. The district attorney's office, which is
involved with every URESA case in Denver, tolerated more variation in or-
ders reached by agreement than either the judges or the private bar.
The district attorney, on the average, also secured higher orders. The
average order when an agreement was reached entirely by the district attor-
ney and the respondent by signed stipulation was $143.31 per month. If a
private attorney was involved and the case settled by signed stipulation, the
average order was $105.00 per month. If the case was settled at court by a
private attorney, the average order was $96.67. If the case went to trial and
40. See note 3 supra.
41. To date, attorneys have not been appointed in URESA cases.
42. The experience covered approximately three years, including the time period of this
study, but was on a part-time basis, handling only one day of hearings per week.
43. These figures include only the cases in which some order was entered.
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the respondent was represented by an attorney,44 the average order was
$114.00 per month. If the respondent went to trial pro se, the average order
was $100.12 per month. The best bet for a respondent seems to be to have
an attorney negotiate an agreement at court.4 5 His next best option is to go
to trial pro se. His third best alternative is to hire an attorney to negotiate
for him prior to the court date. He should go to trial with an attorney only if
necessary. At all costs, he should avoid negotiating alone with the district
attorney.
Remembering that the people represented by attorneys did in fact have
a higher average income, let us compare percentage of income for the five
possible routes.46 The average percentage of income paid by a father who
reached an agreement directly with the district attorney was 22.9%. If the
father was represented by an attorney in reaching a signed stipulation, the
average order was 8.7% of income. When cases were settled at court by the
respondent's attorney, the average order was 12.3% of income. When pri-
vate attorneys took cases to trial, the average award was 14.5%. If the re-
spondent went to trial pro se, the average award was 17.0%. Here there is a
slight change. If the respondent is primarily concerned with paying as small
a percentage of his income as possible, his best routes, in order, are: negotia-
tion by an attorney prior to court date, negotiation by an attorney at court,
trial with an attorney, trial pro se, and negotiation directly with the district
attorney.
Using either method of analysis, a respondent was in greatest jeopardy
dealing directly with the district attorney. The district attorney seems to
secure the lowest orders in terms of dollars by reaching a settlement at court
with a private attorney and to secure an order for the lowest percentage of
income when he negotiates a signed stipulation with an opposing attorney.
The district attorney clearly did best if he negotiated privately with an un-
represented respondent.
The variation in cases handled entirely by private negotiation between
the district attorney and the respondent is the largest range of variation of
any segment of this study. It would appear that the greater the relative
"power" of the district attorney, the greater the variation which will result
among individual orders; yet the presence of the district attorney alone can-
not fully explain the variation in orders.
This article will now discuss the fifth possible explanation-the impact
of the relatively fixed living expenses of the respondents on the amount of
the order.
44. Keep in mind that, as indicated in note 29 supra, few cases actually go to trial when a
respondent is represented by an attorney.
45. Clearly the success of this strategy depends on the cooperation of the deputy district
attorney. The lawyer must be prepared to go to trial, and the respondent must be prepared to
pay him to do so; but the respondent seems to secure a better result, from his point of view, if
the case is not actually heard and decided by the judge.
46. See notes 30 & 31 supra.
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F. Relatiely Fixed Living Expenses of Respondent
The two most common relatively fixed living expenses are car payments
and housing payments. Both are somewhat flexible in amount, but most
people are in fact making some regular monthly payments for both a car and
housing. As in other areas of this study, not all the relevant data was avail-
able for every case. In many cases, neither the court file nor the district
attorney's file included data on either car or housing payments. In 48.8% of
the cases in which some support order was entered, data was available on
either car or housing payments or both.
In those cases in which both car and housing payments were known, the
average combined payment was $332.45 per month. In those same cases, the
average support order was $130.48 per month, 39.2% of the total combined
average car and housing payments. The support order was equal to 20.5% of
the respondent's average monthly income of $638.04, while his car and hous-
ing payments represented 52.1% of his monthly income. The average order
was for the support of 1.6 children.
47
Since car payments may be less fixed than housing payments in that it is
possible to do without a car, it may be of interest to compare car payments
with child support payments. The average car payment was $136.97 per
month. The average support payment of the same fathers was $113.59 per
month. In only 33.3% of the cases was a father ordered to pay more to sup-
port his child or children than he paid for his car. In general, such orders
resulted from agreements at court. In only one out of five cases at trial did
the judge enter a child support order higher than the car payment.
Again, individual cases were quite interesting. One man, paying $250
per month for his car, was ordered to pay $80 per month for the support of
his child. Another man, paying $211 per month for his car, was ordered to
pay $100 per month for the support of his two children from a net income of
$1,000 per month. Both orders were entered as a result of signed stipula-
tions.
It seems clear that support orders will generally be lower than car pay-
ments. The range of variation of support orders as a percentage of car pay-
ments is from 6% to 319.1%. The comparable range of variation between
support orders as a percentage of combined car and housing payments is
13.8% to 68.2%. Clearly, support orders were more closely correlated with
combined car and housing payments than with car payments alone. How-
ever, the variation is so great that the relatively fixed living expenses of re-
spondents do not adequately explain the variation in orders.
G. The Season
Most practicing attorneys are aware that relatively little gets done in
court--or elsewhere--during the latter part of December. Everyone is sim-
47. This number is based only on data from those cases in which both the car and housing
payments were known. The fact that it correlates so well with the average number of children
in all the cases involved indicates that the cases in which car and housing payments are known
are probably representative of all the cases.
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ply too interested in getting ready for the holidays. There appear to be
other, generally unperceived, effects of season on legal proceedings.
Table 9 illustrates the breakdown of support orders by month. The per-
centage of income ordered for support is strikingly lower during November
and December than during the other months. This could be because fathers'
expenses tend to be particularly heavy during those months, and both the
court and the district attorney may tend to accept lower orders in November
and December, despite the fact that the order will be applicable for the en-
tire year.
48
Another interesting factor which emerges from Table 9 is the decided
decrease in activity during July. Perhaps the combined effects of judge, dis-
trict attorney, and private attorney vacations during the summer have more
impact on case activity than the recognized December holiday period.
Since all the data collected in this study pertains only to one calendar
year, it is impossible from this study alone to make a valid analysis of sea-
sonal patterns. Certain patterns seem to emerge from the data. Further
studies are necessary to determine the validity of these apparent patterns.
H. Conclusions on Establishment of Support Orders
It is clear that whether the order is entered by stipulation, by agreement
at court, or by the judge, there is wide variation among the percentages of
income being paid by the respondents. The greatest variation is found in
stipulations reached between the district attorney and respondents not repre-
sented by an attorney. The least variation is found in orders entered by
judges not usually assigned to domestic relations.
The highest orders tend to be entered either when the respondent bar-
gains alone with the district attorney or when a non-domestic relations judge
decides the case. When a respondent is represented by an attorney, his order
tends to be lower-as long as the case does not actually go to trial.
Two-thirds of the fathers are ordered to pay less to support their chil-
dren than they do for their cars.
There may be some seasonal variation in orders, with orders entered in
November and December being substantially lower than orders entered dur-
ing the rest of the year and generally less activity on the cases in July.
No one of the six factors analyzed in this study really explains why one
father with an income of $900 monthly pays $50 per month to support two
children while another father, who has a $450 monthly income, pays $60 per
month to support two children.
When all the cases are considered together without regard to any of the
six possible distinguishing factors, only 2.4% of the orders were for less than
$50 per month, and only 5.9% of the orders were for more than $250 per
month. Eleven and nine-tenth's percent of the orders were for $50; 10.7% of
48. Living expenses are higher in November and December because of heating bills, but
the financial crunch felt by many people prior to'the holiday season may well be an additional
factor.
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the orders for $75; 15.5% for $100; 16.7% for $150. In sum, 54.8% of the
orders were for one of these nice round figures.
The study, though indicating the relative amount of variation found in
various aspects of the process by which a support order is established, did not
isolate what objective factors, if any, actuallly caused the amount of a partic-
ular order to be set at a particular number. It was the impression of this
author, while working on child support cases for the district attorney, that
the objective factors were not the most significant factors in the establish-
ment of child support orders. Rather, the particular attitudes of judges, dis-
trict attorneys, and private attorneys toward each other and toward the
individual respondent seemed to be most decisive.
Would it not be far more just to a father for his child support order to
be determined primarily in accordance with objective standards? Is not the
major difference between respondents really the net income that each has?
How can reliance on personality factors be justified, particularly when the
beneficiaries of the child support orders, the children, are never before the
court?49 Presumably, if the judges, district attorneys, and private lawyers
involved with child support cases met the mothers and children who initi-
ated the support proceedings in other states, they would be affected, favora-
bly or unfavorably, by the personality or particular financial circumstances
of the petitioners. Is it fair to permit subjective factors to be determinative
when only one party is before the court? Would it not be far more just to
establish objective guidelines for establishment of child support orders, at
least in URESA cases?
II. FAMILY AND WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF SUPPORT ORDERS
In 48.8% of the cases, the URESA order was for the benefit of only one
child. In 36%, the URESA order was for two children. Thus, in only 15.2%
of the URESA cases was there an order for the benefit of more than two
children. However, 19.2% of the respondents also had children in a second
family to support. Forty-five and eight-tenths percent of the second families
contained only one child; 37.5% of the second families contained two chil-
dren; and 16.7% of the second families contained more than two children.
The average number of children included in a URESA order was 1.7. The
average total number of children supported by a URESA respondent was
2.1. Thus, fathers subject to URESA orders did not seem to have signifi-
cantly more children than parents generally.
The average age of the oldest child in a URESA family was 10.2; so
URESA does not seem to be used primarily for the benefit of children of
short marriages.50 The age of children named on URESA petitions ranged
49. The petitioner and the children are represented before the court only by a deputy
district attorney, who in nearly all cases has never seen, or been in personal contact with, the
people he represents. See note 3 supra.
50. The marriages may have been stormy, or they may have been short; however, in most
cases a URESA petition is filed within a year or two after dissolution of the marriage. It should
be noted, moreover, that there is no requirement that the respondent have ever been married.
The only issue is whether the respondent is the father of the children and, therefore, owes them
a duty of support.
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from one to eighteen.5 '
Most children for whom URESA cases are brought are receiving wel-
fare. Of the total number of cases included in the study, 60.2% of the chil-
dren were receiving welfare; 39.8% were not. Although URESA is available
to both welfare and non-welfare recipients, welfare departments tend to file
more URESA cases and to persist in prosecuting them.
52
In those cases in which a support order was entered and the amount of
welfare was known, 76% of the support orders were for less than the amount
of welfare. In 16% of the cases, the support ordered was enough to get the
children off welfare. In 8% of the cases the support order was exactly the
same as the amount of welfare being paid. Thus, in 76% of the cases, the
children remained on welfare after the order was entered.
The fathers of welfare recipients were neither outstandlingly rich nor
extremely poor. On the average, they had a net income of $594.75 per
month; a net income, after taxes, social security, union dues, etc., of $7,137
per year.
Of course, some respondents had a higher income. One man with net
income of $874 per month ($10,488 per year after taxes) was ordered to pay
$50 per month ($600 per year) to support two children. The taxpayers in
the state of the children's residence were contributing $258 per month
($3,096 per year) for the support of the two children.
At the other end of the spectrum was a father with a net income of $450
per month ($5,400 per year) who was ordered to pay $150 per month ($1,800
per year) to support one child. The taxpayers were paying almost an equal
amount ($1,872 per year) for the support of his child. If the man with net
annual income of $5,400 actually makes the support payments ordered, his
child will probably be off welfare. The children of the man with the net
income of $10,488 per year probably will continue to be supported primarily
by the taxpayers.
III. ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ORDERS
How well are payments really made under support orders? Do men
with low orders and high incomes tend to be more dependable in making
51. An occasional petition came through for the benefit of a child not yet born. In addi-
tion, some questions arose as to whether a respondent was liable for support of a child 18 or over
who would have been considered emancipated under the laws of his home state. It was the
position of the Denver District Attorney's Office that the state law of the responding jurisdiction
was to be applied in such situations, and that Colorado law requires a parent to pay support for
his child until the child reaches 21 or is otherwise emancipated. See Cowo. REV. STAT. §§ 2-4-
401, 14-5-105 (1973); accord, Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 585 P.2d 599 (Colo. App. 1978); In re
Marriage of Weaver, 571 P.2d 307 (Colo. App. 1977).
In re Marriage of Fetters, 584 P.2d 104 (Colo. App. 1978) provides an interesting case in
which respondent's daughter was held to be temporarily emancipated during her voidable mar-
riage. When the marriage was annulled, the respondent was obligated to resume child support
payments.
52. In many cases, it takes three months or more for a URESA case to reach its first court
hearing after the initial petition is filed. There may then be repeated delays which may become




payments? Is the size of the original order a factor in enforcement? Are the
ages of the children or the fathers' incomes factors? What methods of en-
forcement, if any, seem to be most effective?
An attempt will be made to answer these questions. First, a caveat is in
order. The enforcement part of this study includes only problem cases, those
in which the father did not pay as ordered. The primary means of enforce-
ment in such a case is to cite the father for contempt of court for failure to
obey the court order. After a court hearing, the father may be found in
contempt of court and ordered to pay a fine or serve a jail sentence.
53
The factors relevant in determining whether a man is in contempt of
court are numerous. Many of them are also difficult to quantify. For exam-
ple, when a support order is established, the income of the father and the
number of children to be supported are almost always easily ascertainable
and appear as part of the court records. In a contempt case, however, many
of the significant factors will not appear in the record.
A father's attitude toward payment of support is crucial in a hearing on
a contempt citation.54 The willfullness of a failure to pay is usually ascer-
tained in large part by the demeanor and attitude of a respondent in court.
It might be clear to everyone in the courtroom that a father had no intention
of paying child support under any circumstances, but there would almost
never be a specific finding of that mental attitude in the order of the court.
The mental attitude of the respondent, which plays a very large role in con-
tempt citation cases, has not been included in this study.
Another important factor which has been omitted from the study of
contempt citations is the background financial situation of the respondent.
While, the current income of the respondent frequently was available,55 and
some attempt was made to determine whether the respondent's employment
had been relatively steady, 56 actual periods of unemployment, unexpectedly
large medical bills, and unusual financial crises of other kinds did not appear
in the court records. Therefore, such matters, recognized as highly signifi-
cant on a contempt citation, have not been included in this study.
It is in the field of contempt citations that the individual wisdom and
discretion of the judge are most important. It should be recognized that a
53. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-5-127 (1973).
54. See Marshall v. Marshall, 35 Colo. App. 442, 445-46, 551 P.2d 709, 710 (1976). In
order to find a father guilty of contempt of court, the court must find that he knew of his
obligation to pay support under the court order, and that he had an ability to pay all or part of
support ordered. Therefore, a man who is unemployed or who simply did not have the financial
ability to pay support would not normally be held in contempt of court. The only cases in
which an unemployed person might be held in contempt of court are those in which the court
finds that the unemployment itself is willful.
55. The availability of this information depended in large part on the willingness of the
respondent to fill out the financial affidavit forms which were supplied to him prior to the court
hearing. In addition, at the hearing itself, the deputy district attorney would undoubtedly ask
the necessary questions to ascertain the current income of the respondent as part of the crucial
proof necessary to find the respondent in contempt.
56. In some files a pattern of intermittent employment was clear. Frequently, the files of
construction workers or day laborers hired on a temporary basis would show a pattern of such
employment. In many cases, however, it simply could not be ascertained conclusively whether a
father's employment had been steady.
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judge is usually in the position of enforcing an order made by another judge.
Since new judges rotate into the Domestic Relations Division of Denver Dis-
trict Court each year, it is unusual for a judge to be asked to enforce one of
his own orders.5 7 If a judge personally believes that an order for one child
should be approximately 20% of the father's income, he may have difficulty
enforcing an order for 48% of income. Furthermore, a judge has no author-
ity to change the amount of a child support order as part of a hearing on a
contempt citation.
58
Recognizing the problems inherent in a study of contempt citations, let
us return to the initial questions posed at the beginning of this section: Do
men with lower orders pay better? Is the age of the children a significant
factor? What sort of enforcement seems to work best?
A. Size of the Original Order
When a case comes before the court on a contempt citation, it means
that something is wrong. Either the order was too high to begin with, the
respondent has had unexpected financial difficulties, or the respondent sim-
ply does not intend to comply in full with the order. The unexpected
financial difficulties of the respondent and his personal attitude do not ap-
pear in the court records; therefore, these factors are not part of this study.
The size of the order, however, is readily available for consideration.
Rather striking results were obtained when the cases included in this
study were analyzed on a purely financial basis. First, it was determined
what percentage of a man's income he was ordered to pay for child support,
based on his income at the time the order was entered. Then this data was
further broken down as to what percentage of income on the average was
ordered for the support of one, two, or more children. The percentages were
12.1% for one child, 19.0% for two children, 27.1% for three children, 25.6%
for four children, 33.4% for five children, and 30.6% for six children. This
compares with 1977-78 orders which averaged 14.5% for one child and 18.6%
for two children. In the study of 1977-78 support orders, there were not
enough families with more than two children to make the data for larger
families significant.
The fact that the average percentage of income represented by orders
for one child in 1977-78, 14.5%, is larger than the average for the contempt
cases, 12.1%, may indicate either of two things. First, it may indicate that
cases do not become problems requiring enforcement through contempt cita-
tions merely because the orders are too high. The majority of support orders
do not require constant enforcement. 59 Furthermore, the average order
57. Of the 133 cases included on Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16, in only 12 instances was the
enforcement action taken within one year of entry of the original order.
58. CoLo. R. Civ. P. 107(c)-(d) indicates the extent of the hearing to be held on a con-
tempt citation. Modification is an entirely separate issue.
59. For the calendar year 1977, 574 new cases were brought before the Denver District
Court on petitions for a support order, and only 266 contempt citations were brought before the
court. Since contempt citations may be brought in any case in which a support order previously
has been entered, it seems clear that in most cases the respondent is not brought before the court
after the initial support order has been entered.
19791
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
seems to be as high or higher than the orders requiring enforcement. Sec-
ond, the comparison could indicate that enforcement is particularly difficult
for the 1977-78 orders, the time frame of the study, or that any order near or
above 12.1% is hard to enforce. It seems unlikely, however, that the orders of
1977-78, on the average, were substantially higher than orders for any other
year.
60
When the percentages of income ordered for the support of two children
in the 1977-78 cases (18.6%) and the contempt citation cases (19.0%) are
compared, there does not seem to be a significant difference. Evidently, or-
ders in this range have at least their share of problems in enforcement.
There was, of course, a variation in the number of orders which fell into
any particular percentile group. Fifteen and one-tenth percent of the orders
were for less than 11% of the respondent's income at the time the order was
made. Forty-one and five-tenths percent of the orders were for amounts be-
tween 11% and 20% of the father's current income. Twenty-six and four-
tenths percent of the orders were between 21% and 30%. Thirteen and two-
tenths percent of the orders were between 31% and 40%. Only 2.8% of the
orders were between 41% and 50%. The highest single order, in terms of
percentages, was for 50%, ordering a salesman to pay $250 per month for the
support of his two children from a commission averaging $500 per month.
The original support order was less than a year old when the case came to
court on a citation. At that time it was continued by agreement of the re-
spondent's attorney and the district attorney to allow time for the respon-
dent to make payments on $1,250 in arrears.
The over all average percentage of order to income on cases brought
before the court on contempt citations was 20.5% ($117.94).6' The income
of respondents seems to be higher at the time of the citation than it had been
at the time of the original order. The average monthly income of respon-
dents at the time of entry of the orders was $593.27. At the time the orders
were before the court for enforcement, the average income of the respon-
dents had increased to $763.73 per month-an increase of 28.8% during a
time when the amount of the orders stayed fixed.
What sort of jobs do respondents in child support cases hold? Are they
all relatively low income people with seriously fluctuating income? The an-
swer appears to be that people from a large spectrum of employment have
problems paying child support. The respondents included an engineer, a
mortgage banker, a contract administrator for an aircraft company, police
officers, truck drivers, retired military men, an entertainer, a deputy sheriff, a
United States Air Force sergeant, clerks, janitors, typists, gas station attend-
ants, bartenders, butchers, shoe salesmen, carpenters, painters, welders, shop
foremen, bakers, and many others. In fact, from the wealth of occupations,
60. The author's experience did not indicate any such variation in the orders for the time
period included in this study. In addition, the fact that the guidelines have remained un-
changed for such a long time is some indication that there probably has not been any dramatic
shift in the amount of support ordered by the Denver District Court.
61. This percentage is below the maximum ordered in any of the situations analyzed, but
it does approach the upper limit of the orders entered by experienced domestic relations judges
after trial at court.
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it was difficult to come up with any particularly appropriate categories.
62
The following categories were chosen, however, to illustrate the variety of
occupations. Seven percent of the respondents were white collar workers.
Missionaries, truck drivers, and retired military persons each accounted for
1.4% of the respondents. Professional persons and supervisory personnel
each made up 2.7% of the sample. The self-employed were 4.1%. Salesmen,
skilled workers, and the unemployed each constituted 4.8% of the group.
Next came unskilled workers with 6.1% and government workers with 6.8%.
Finally, 17.6% of the sample were employed with the particular job un-
known, and the employment situation of 40.7% of the respondents was un-
known. Perhaps, in a larger study, particular employment patterns might
emerge, but in this study the large variety of occupations seemed to be the
significant finding.
It would not appear, then, that people with certain kinds of jobs have
significantly more difficulty in paying child support than others. One thing
that does seem to distinguish respondents in contempt citations from other
people under child support orders, however, is the size of their families.
B. Famil Considerations
The average respondent in a new support order was ordered to pay sup-
port for 1.7 children. 63 That same father, on the average, was supporting .4
children in a second family, for a total of 2.164 children. In the problem
support cases brought to court on citations, the average respondent was sup-
porting 3.4 children, 2.2 in his first family, for whom the support order was
made and 1.2 in his second family. The average size of a respondent's sec-
ond family in a contempt citation case was therefore approximately three
times as large as the average second family for the respondents on new sup-
port orders, 1.2 compared with .4 children.
The difference is even more striking considering that almost none of the
families for whom a new support order was entered contained more than two
children. By contrast, in those cases which were brought before the court on
a citation, 38.1% of the original families had one child; 25.9% had two chil-
dren; 21.1% had three children; 7.5% had four children; 5.4% had five chil-
dren; and 2.0% had six children. The range for children in the respondent's
second family was comparable. 65 The respondents who seemed to have
62. Ruth Bennett and Mona Goodwin, law student assistants who collected the data for
this study, simply wrote down the best description of the respondents' employment which could
be obtained from the file of the district attorney; e.g., cab driver, janitor, stock clerk, salesman.
Robert Truhlar, law student assistant who coordinated all the data collected, chose 14 represen-
tative categories and determined in which category each particular occupation should be
placed. The categories selected were employed, job unknown; government worker; missionary;
professional; retired military; salesman; self-employed; skilled; supervisory; truck driver; unem-
ployed; unknown; unskilled. In a larger study, these categories might be further refined to
plumbers, electricians, janitors, etc. However, in this study the number of cases involved was
simply too small to justify more specific categories.
63. See Farmil and W/are Consequences of Support Orders, Part II of the text supra.
64. d.
65. Although 47.2% of the second families had no children, 9.4% had one child, 28.3% had
two children, 5.8% had three children, 1.9% had four children, 5.8% had five children, and one
family (1.9%) was reported to have nine children.
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more trouble paying child support also seemed to be the fathers who had
larger families. No guess will be hazarded as to which is cause and which is
effect.
The children of a respondent cited for contempt seemed to be somewhat
older than the children involved in a new support order.66 The average
youngest child of a respondent cited for contempt was 10.5 years old; the
average oldest child was 13.1 years old.6 7 Since the average time between
entry of a support order and a citation for contempt was 2.9 years, the age of
the children seems to indicate nothing more than the passage of time be-
tween the entry of the order and enforcement.
It is interesting to note how old some of the children were. In the cases
in which there had been two or more contempt citations, the average age of
the youngest child is 12.8 years; and, in 37.9% of those cases, the youngest
child is 16 years of age or older, as indicated by Table 10. It appears that as
children near the age of emancipation their mothers realize that chances of
collecting past due child support will be even slimmer after the children
leave home. In fact, the debt of past due child support continues after the
children become emancipated, 6 8 and it is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
69
Mothers, probably correctly, seem to think that courts will not be overly
enthusiastic about enforcing child support orders after the children are
grown. 70
The data in this study, in contrast to the data in other studies,7 I does
not indicate that men pay less well as their children get older. Although that
may be the case, there simply was not a significant gap between the average
age of the youngest child in the new support cases and the average age of the
youngest child in citation cases.
C. Methods of Enforcement
Probably all judges and all attorneys involved with child support cases,
not to mention the parties, would like to know what methods of enforcement
work best. David Chambers has suggested that a self-starting enforcement
procedure and a high jailing rate are the most effective combination.
72 Den-
66. See Family and Welfare Consequences of Support Orders, Part II of the text supra, indicating
that the average age of the oldest child on a new support order is 10.2 years.
67. These numbers were obtained by using the data from all citation cases, including
duplicates.
68. See Beardshear v. Beardshear, 143 Colo. 293, 352 P.2d 969 (1960) in which the Colo-
rado Supreme Court stated that "mature installments in a divorce decree are final judgements."
143 Colo. at 296, 352 P.2d at 970. Moreover, "the payments in question are, under our practice,
considered final and not modifiable." 143 Colo. at 297, 352 P.2d at 971.
69. it U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976) provides that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy shall release a
bankrupt from all of his provable debts. . . except such as. . . (7) are. . . for maintenance or
support of-wife or child." See, e.g., Hylek v. Hylek, 148 F.2d 300, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1945).
70. In court hearings, when a judge becomes aware that the children of the respondent are
now emancipated and supporting themselves, his order for repayment of the arrears is likely to
be set at an extremely low level.
71. Se, e.g., Conti, ChildSupport: Htzr, Her, or Their Responsibility? 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 707
(1976).
72. U-M Researcher Studies Child Support System, 22 L. QUADRANGLE NOTES I (Winter 1978)





The Denver District Attorney's Office, which initiates the issuance of all
contempt citations in Denver URESA cases, has no method of checking on a
routine basis to determine whether a respondent is paying. 73 The only time
a citation is issued is when the intended recipient of child support complains
to the district attorney. When such a complaint is made, the pay record of
the respondent is called up on the computer, and a citation is prepared if the
respondent is significantly behind. Usually, a respondent will need to be at
least two months behind before the court mechanism will be geared up for a
citation. Occasionally, when a citation does not seem necessary, one of the
deputy district attorneys in the child support division will send a letter to the
respondent or call the respondent's attorney. As a general rule, no action is
taken until the situation seems to be serious enough to warrant a citation. If
the intended recipient of child support does not complain, the father can
stop paying entirely, and nothing will happen.
The second effective factor in enforcement, a high jailing rate, also is
lacking in Denver. In the 152 contempt citation cases studied, only one re-
spondent was sent to jail for failure to pay child support. Clearly, Denver
does not have a high jailing rate. Occasionally, however, a respondent in
Denver is threatened seriously with jail. In six cases, 3.9% of the total, a
respondent was sentenced to jail. The sentences were then suspended on the
condition that the respondents begin to make payments.
No particular judge in Denver seems to be more reluctant to send a
father to jail for failure to pay child support than any other judge. In fact,
Table 11 indicates that there is really only one judge in Denver who will
consider such a tactic, at least among the ten judges Who handled some con-
tempt citations during the period of the study. Only 4.6% of the respondents
were seriously threatened with jail, which does not constitute a high rate. A
man appearing before the Denver District Court on a citation, in fact, has an
extremely small chance of going to jail.
The enforcement method most commonly used in Denver seems to be
repeated issuance of citations. On the average in the survey cases, .96 prior
citations had been issued. Fifty-two and six-tenths percent of the respon-
dents had received no prior citations, 25.8% had received one prior citation,
and 21.6% had received two or more citations. Some respondents had re-
ceived as many as seven prior citations, but in most instances the record was
not nearly that bad.
This does not mean that the respondents were particularly good about
paying, though the record is certainly not as bad as it might be. The average
respondent, when cited for contempt, appeared to be $1,760.90 behind in his
payments, based only on the amount owed under the Denver support or-
der.
7 4
Within the ten days before their court appearances, 26.8% of the re-
73. Additional staff simply does not seem to be available to add this task to the tasks al-
ready undertaken by the existing child support staff.
74. Additional arrearages may be owed in other states and are frequently alleged on a
petition for support when the action is initiated in the Colorado courts. Because proof is not
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spondents made some payment. Checks for .8% of such payments bounced.
With the exception of the occasional check that bounced, at least some
money seemed to be collected simply as a result of initiating court action. A
few respondents paid the accrued arrears entirely before the court date.
75
Whether the cost of this form of collection is appropriate is an issue that is
beyond the scope of this article.
Table 12 indicates the type of case in which a payment typically was
made within ten days before the court hearing. The success of such a tactic
seems unquestionable: in 44.1% of the cases in which a respondent made a
payment ten days before the hearing, the contempt citation was then dis-
missed, despite the average continuing arrears of $1,282.14 in those cases.
Private attorneys seem to be aware of the efficacy of this practice, since
33.3% of such payments were made by fathers represented by attorneys, even
though private attorneys handled only 22.7% of the total cases included on
Table 12.
One effective means of enforcement, then, seems to be the mere issuing
of a contempt citation and setting it for hearing. Perhaps if a procedure
could be developed in the district attorney's office to check payments and
initiate contempt citations on a regular basis, this means of enforcement
could be even more effective. A man might be more inclined to make
prompt support payments if he were aware that after missing payments for
three consecutive months he would be cited for contempt of court. At least,
based on this study, 26.8% of the respondents would make some payment
within ten days of the date the case was set to go to court. 76 Such a system
seems to have worked effectively in Michigan.
77
There are some distinct advantages to a self-starting, automatic system
and some crucial disadvantages. The chief advantages, in addition to secur-
ing more frequent payments, are that the court would appear to be serious
about its orders,78 and that the burden would no longer be placed on the
individual petitioner to request enforcement by the district attorney's office.
There is a definite problem when enforcement depends on the individ-
ual request of the person for whose benefit the order is made.79 Enforcement
then becomes just another negotiating tool between two people who gener-
ally are not getting along very well anyway. A mother may threaten to have
a contempt citation issued if a father insists on exercising his rights to visit
his children, although the law clearly provides that visitation and child sup-
port payments must be treated as separate issues.80 Occasionally a mother
who wants her second husband to adopt the children of her first marriage
apparently will use the threat of a contempt citation as a way to force the
readily available on arrearages alleged in other jurisdictions, this study made no attempt to
ascertain how much money may be owed under court orders in other jurisdictions.
75. See Tables 12 through 16.
76. Id.
77. See -M Researcher Studies Child Support Systzm, supra note 72, at 1.
78. The effect of this tactic may be lessened when a respondent is repeatedly cited for
contempt and discovers that he is in no real danger of being sent to jail.
79. Enforcement may be requested either by an individual petitioner or by a welfare de-
partment making payments for the children.
80. Vigil v. Vigil, 30 Colo. App. 452, 453-54, 494 P.2d 609, 611 (1972).
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natural father to give his consent to the adoption. 8 A man suddenly faced
with court proceedings to collect a large arrears of child support payments
who may think that he is in danger of going to jail may be more receptive to
the idea of signing the requested consent for adoption forms. If the power to
determine when a contempt citation would be brought did not rest in the
mother's hands, improper conduct of this kind would be avoided.
Routine, steady enforcement of support orders has worked in Michi-
gan.8 2 However, there are several problems with routine, steady enforce-
ment for Denver. The first, most decisive problem is that neither the district
attorney nor the district court has the staff for such enforcement. Like exten-
sive plea bargaining, rather sporadic enforcement for support orders does, at
least, keep many of the cases out of court. Presumably no child goes hungry
because his father does not pay the court-ordered support. Rather, the child
relies more heavily on welfare or a higher percentage of his support comes
from his mother or stepfather.83 Either result probably is less expensive to
society as a whole than a high, consistent rate of court enforcement of child
support orders.
If the choice is between a rather high, steady rate of court enforcement
and a much lower, more sporadic rate of court enforcement, it is clear that a
high rate of court enforcement would be more effective, but a low rate of
enforcement may actually be less expensive to society.
Other means of enforcement are available. In many cases, the order
may be made almost self-enforcing. This is done by the simple technique of
requiring the respondent to execute an assignment of wages. 84 By an assign-
ment of wages, the respondent requests and the court orders that the respon-
dent's employer withhold from each of respondent's paychecks an amount
sufficient to meet his child support obligation for the applicable period. The
employer then sends the money directly to the clerk of the Denver District
Court, who forwards it to the initiating court. The payment is then for-
warded by the initiating court to the petitioner, or the welfare department,
as appropriate. 85
Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16 indicate the frequency with which various
district court judges have ordered assignments. Judge A ordered assign-
81. Only a few instances of this tactic came to the attention of the author while engaged in
child support work with the district attorney. The fact that the tactic is ever effective should be
of grave concern.
82. See U-M Researcher Studies Child Support Sstem, supra note 72, at I.
83. In many cases, it seems clear that the second husband of the mother is in fact support-
ing the children in his household. Perhaps society should simply recognize that this will be the
result. It does seem, however, to put additional pressure on the mother to remarry.
84. In most cases, an assignment resulted from bargaining between the district attorney
and the respondent. If the respondent agreed to execute an assignment of wages, then the
district attorney normally would agree to move to have the contempt citation dismissed or at
least to have the citation continued for a period of four to six months to ascertain whether the
assignment was effective. In some cases, the judge also would indicate that the citation would
be dismissed if an assignment were signed. In one case, the judge indicated that the respondent
must either sign an assignment of wages or go to jail. To the surprise of everyone, including
counsel for the respondent, the respondent indicated that he would prefer to go to jail. The
final resolution of the case was that the citation was simply continued with an admonition to the
respondent to make his payments as ordered. In fact, the respondent made such payments.
85. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-5-129 (1973).
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ments in 11.3% of the cases. Judge B ordered assignments in 11.1% of his
cases. Assignments were never ordered by Judge C. Judge F ordered assign-
ments in 9.1% of his cases. Thus the rate for all four judges is relatively low.
There may be a seasonal pattern in the ordering of assignments. Ap-
proximately 64% of the assignments were made during the relatively cold
months of October, November, December, and February. Why assignments
as a means of enforcement may be more attractive to judges in these months
is not indicated by the study.
In 64.3% of the cases in which an assignment of wages was ordered, the
contempt citation was dismissed at the same time, which meant that the
court was no longer involved with that particular citation. In 42.9% of the
cases in which an assignment was not ordered, however, the case was contin-
ued to another date, requiring at least one more day of court involvement.
It is clear from an examination of the average arrears remaining for the non-
assignment cases in which the citation was continued ($2,143.69) that the
underlying problem really had not been resolved.
Judge A seemed to order assignments for fathers with relatively low in-
comes ($576.71 average) who had not been to court often before (average
number of prior citations .43). Judge B tended to order assignments for re-
spondents with higher incomes ($851 average) who had had slightly more
than the average number of prior citations (.83). The data thus may indi-
cate an underlying difference in the philosophies of the two judges. Which
philosophy is more effective for enforcement purposes simply requires more
data.
The answer to the question of why assignments were not used more
often is difficult to ascertain. Sometimes skilled workers were ordered to exe-
cute assignments; sometimes they were not. Unfortunately, the data simply
does not seem to indicate any pattern. In fact, the individual's particular
employment history-his number of years at the same job-was normally a
significant factor in determining whether or not an assignment would be
ordered. Such data, unfortunately, was generally not included in the files
and thus not available for this study.
Although assignments would seem to be a highly effective, low cost
means of enforcement, they simply will not work for the self-employed, un-
employed, or those who change jobs frequently.
Probably the only other alternative means of enforcement is incarcera-
tion. How effective does this seem to be in Denver? First, the answer is
extremely hard to determine, because so few people (4.6%) were ever even
sentenced to jail during the period studied. When the tool was used, how-
ever, it probably was not effective. Using Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16, we note
that 14.2% of the respondents from whom data was available had been sen-
tenced to jail previously. Of those who had previously been ordered to serve
time in jail, 71.4% had actually served some time, yet they appeared again
before the court on contempt citations. Evidently these fathers simply would
not pay child support, and being sentenced to jail, or actually serving some
time, did not shake their resolve. If only 4.6% of the respondents on a con-
tempt citation are given jail sentences, and yet 14.2% of the same group of
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respondents have been sentenced to jail before, jailing does not seem to con-
stitute a particularly effective tool for enforcement in Denver.
What, then, seems to be the keys for enforcement? The size of the order
relative to income does not seem to matter. The age of the children involved
is not significant. The number of children involved is important. It is pre-
dictable that men with larger families will have more problems paying child
support and will appear more often before the court on contempt citations.
Jail is hardly ever used in Denver and, when used, does not seem to be par-
ticularly effective. Assignments seem to be both effective and economical for
society, but they are not appropriate in all cases and are, in fact, ordered in
only approximately 11% of the cases. A significant number of payments
seem to be secured simply by issuing a contempt citation and setting it for
hearing, but that may be a relatively expensive means of enforcement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because of the very high percentage of children in the United States
who do not live with both their natural parents, child support is of potential
major significance to society; yet there seem to be serious problems with both
the establishment and enforcement of support orders. The orders which are
established do not seem to be consistent. No one of the six objective factors
analyzed in the study of establishment orders really explains why one father
pays $50 per month to support two children from a net monthly income of
$900 while another father pays $60 per month to support two children from
a net monthly income of $450. Too often the amount of the order seems to
be determined primarily by the interaction of the judge, district attorney,
private attorney, and respondent involved, with the personalities and moods
of each of these individuals dictating the result.
The ability of the father to pay, based on his net monthly income, is not
the determinative factor, even though the law indicates that the ability of
the father to pay and the needs of the children should be the oni issues in a
URESA case.8 6 Whether the order is entered by stipulation, by agreement
at court, or by the judge, there is wide variation among the percentages of
income paid by the respondents. 8 7 The greatest variation is found in stipula-
tions reached between the district attorney and respondents not represented
by an attorney. The least variation is found on orders entered by judges not
usually assigned to domestic relations.
The highest support orders tend to be entered either when the respon-
dent bargains alone with the district attorney or when a non-domestic rela-
tions judge decides the case. When a respondent is represented by an
attorney, his order tends to be lower, as long as the case does not actually go
to trial.
86. Vigil v. Vigil, 30 Colo. App. 452, 453-54, 494 P.2d 609, 611 (1972).
87. The range in the amount of the order as a percentage of the respondent's income is as
follows: 5.7%-52.9% in stipulations between the district attorney and unrepresented respon-
dents, 6%-31.6% when respondent is represented by an attorney, 5.6%-26.6% in orders entered at




The relatively fixed living expenses of the respondent do not adequately
explain the variation in orders. Support orders as a percentage of car and
housing payments vary widely. It is interesting to note, however, that two-
thirds of the fathers for whom data was available were ordered to pay less to
support their children than their car payments.
Some variation in orders may be attributable to seasonal factors, with
orders entered in November and December being substantially lower than
orders entered during the rest of the year.
When all the cases are considered together without regard to any of the
six possible distinguishing factors, only 2.4% of the support orders were less
than $50 per month, and only 5.9% were more than $250 per month. The
majority of the new support orders (54.8%) were for even figures: 11.9% for
$50, 10.7% for $75, 15.5% for $100, and 16.7% for $150. The study, though
indicating the relative amount of variation in various aspects of the process
by which orders were established, did not isolate the objective factors, if any,
that cause the amount of a particular support order to be set at a particular
sum.
The needs of the children seem to receive virtually no consideration
when the amount of support to be ordered is determined. The majority of
children who were on welfare when a support order was sought remained on
welfare even when the order was paid in full. There can be no question that
the actual needs of any child far exceed the minimal amount of support
available from welfare. Children of men who, in fact, have enough money to
support them are being supported by other taxpayers. Yet the taxpayers
show no signs of a serious protest against this practice. Instead, inadequate
and inconsistent support orders are entered, followed by sporadic, unequal,
and frequently ineffective enforcement.
Denver has no systematic method of initiating enforcement proceedings
against a father who fails to make child support payments. Unless the
mother of the children or a welfare department initiates enforcement pro-
ceedings, the father may discontinue support payments without any legal
consequences.
In the contempt citation cases analyzed in this study, the two most ef-
fective means of enforcement seemed to be repeated issuing of contempt cita-
tions and securing assignments of wages. Of these two methods, issuance of
contempt citations is the more expensive and the more common approach.
Jailing was rarely used as a means of enforcement in Denver.
The actual pattern of establishment and enforcement of child support
orders in Denver is significantly different from the pattern which the law
would seem to suggest. It would seem to be far preferable, given the poten-
tial importance of child support, to take time to establish fair, consistent
standards to be used in establishing support orders, so that all children and
all fathers would be treated equally, no matter who the particular lawyers
and judges involved with each case might be. Then, if the courts and society
are serious about enforcing child support obligations, the orders should be
consistently and effectively enforced. The required judicial machinery is




MAXIMUM WELFARE GRANT IN COLORADO AS OF FEBRUARY, 1979
Number in Household Summer Winter
One Adult Plus: April - October November - March
I Child S 201 S 217
2 Children 252 269
3 Children 307 326
4 Children 363 383
5 Children 413 441
TABLE 2
GUIDELINES FOR MONTHLY CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS
Net
Income
Per % of Net 2 % of Net 3 % of
Month I Child Income Children Income Children Net Income
$ 146
or (19% (35%
less $ 27.95 min.) $ 51.60 min.) $64.50 (44% min.)
150 30.10 (20%) 51.60 (34%) 64.50 (43%)
176 32.25 (18%) 55.90 (32%) 68.80 (39%)
198 34.40 (17%) 55.90 (28%) 86.00 (43%)
220 36.55 (17%) 62.35 (28%) 77.40 (35%)
240 38.70 (16%) 70.95 (30%) 83.85 (35%)
262 43.00 (16%) 71.10 (27%) 94.50 (36%)
284 45.15 (16%) 81.70 (29%) 101.00 (36%)
305 49.45 (16%) 88.15 (29%) 118.25 (39%)
327 53.75 (16%) 98.90 (30%) 129.00 (39%)
348 58.05 (17%) 105.35 (30%) 135.45 (39%)
370 62.35 (17%) 113.95 (31%) 141.90 (38%)
391 64.50 (16%) 120.40 (31%) 154.80 (40%)
412 68.80 (17%) 129.00 (31%) 163.40 (40%)
435 73.10 (17%) 137.60 (32%) 172.00 (40%)
455 77.40 (17%) 146.20 (32%) 180.60 (40%)
477 81.70 (17%) 154.80 (32%) 191.35 (40%)
500 86.00 (17%) 163.40 (33%) 199.95 (40%)
520 90.30 (17%) 172.00 (33%) 208.55 (40%)
540 96.75 (18%) 180.60 (33%) 217.15 (40%)
563 103.20 (18%) 189.20 (34%) 225.75 (40%)
612 109.65 (18%) 197.80 (32%) 234.35 (38%)
606 116.10 (19%) 206.40 (34%) 242.95 (40%)
628 122.55 (20%) 215.00 (34%) 258.00 (41%)
650 129.00 (20%) 223.60 (34%) 270.90 (42%)
670 133.33 (20%) 227.90 (34%) 277.35 (41%)
692 137.60 (20%) 236.50 (34%) 283.80 (41%)
714 141.90 (20%) 240.80 (34%) 290.25 (41%)
735 146.20 (20%) 249.40 (34%) 296.70 (40%)
756 150.50 (20%) 253.70 (34%) 303.15 (40%)
778 154.80 (20%) 262.30 (34%) 309.60 (40%)
800 159.10 (20%) 266.60 (33%) 316.05 (40%)
821 163.40 (20%) 275.20 (34%) 322.50 (39%)
843 167.70 (20%) 279.50 (33%) 335.40 (40%)





885 176.30 (20%) 296.70 (34%) 354.75 (40%)
903 180.60 (20%) 305.30 (34%) 364.43 (40%)
928 184.90 (20%) 313.90 (34%) 374.10 (40%)
950 189.20 (20%) 322.50 (34%) 383.78 (40%)
972 193.50 (20%) 331.10 (34%) 393.45 (40%)
993 197.80 (20%) 339.70 (34%) 403.13 (41%)
1,015 202.10 (20%) 348.30 (34%) 412.80 (41%)
1,036 206.40 (20%) 356.90 (34%) 422.48 (41%)
1,058 210.70 (20%) 365.50 (35%) 432.15 (41%)
1,079 215.00 (20%) 374.10 (35%) 441.83 (41%)
1,100 219.30 (20%) 382.70 (35%) 451.50 (41%)
1,122 223.60 (20%) 391.30 (35%) 461.18 (41%)
1,144 227.90 (20%) 399.90 (35%) 470.85 (41%)
1,165 232.20 (20%) 408.50 (35%) 480.53 (41%)
1,187 236.50 (20%) 417.10 (35%) 490.20 (41%)
1,208 240.80 (20%) 425.70 (35%) 499.88 (41%)
TABLE 3
JUXE A
Cases in Which Some Child Support Ordered
and Respondent's Income Known
Amount of Order Net Monthly Income % of Income Number of Children Amount/Child
S 40 $ 550 7.2% 2 5 20.00
50 445 11.2% 1 50.00
50 840 6.0% 1 50.00
65 618 10.5% 1 65.00
75 334 22.5% 1 75.00
75 875 8.6% 1 75.00
75 900 8.3% 1 75.00
75 785 9.6% 1 75.00
75 581 13.0% 1 75.00
90 350 25.7% 2 45.00
100 420 23.8% 1 100.00
100 561 17.8% 2 50.00
100 525 19.0% 2 50.00
100 515 19.4% 2 50.00
100 600 16.7% 1 100.00
t00 1,000 10.0% 2 50.00
112 400 28.0% 2 56.00
125 560 T2.3% 1 125.00
125 800 15.6% 4 31.25
150 400 37.5% 2 75.00
150 676 T2.2% 2 75.00
I50 800 18.7% I 150.00
150 135 II l.]% 4 37.50
150 475 31.6% 3 50.00
175 640 27.3% 2 87.50
225 900 25.0% 3 75.00
250 838 29.8% 2 125.00
270 968 27.9% 3 90.00
300 625 48.0% 3 100.00
300 1,000 30.0% 3 100.00
Average Order - $129.38 Average % - 20.5%
Range 6.0% to 48.0%*6
Average Per Child - $70.79
*All aveeage exclude the I 11.1% order




Cases in Which Some Child Support Ordered





























Average Order - $96.07 Average % - 16.3%
Range 5.6% to 33.3%**
Average Per Child - S68.26
$All averages exclude the 100% order
-Excluding the 10t, order
TABLE 5
JUDGE C
Cases in Which Some Child Support Ordered
and Respondent's Income Known



















Average Per Child = $77.78Average % - 18.6%








Cases in Which Some Child Support Ordered
and Respondent's Income Known
Net
Monthly
Amount of Order Income
Average Order = $133.33
Number of
% of Income Children
Average '% - 24.3%
Amount/Child
Average Per Child = $80.00
Range 10.5% to 41.7%
TABLE 7
JUDGE A
Orders Entered After a Contest at Court
Net
Monthly
Amount of Order Income
Number of















Average Per Child = $48.00
Range 7.25h, to 18.6%'*
If Respondent has no Attorney
Average Order - S110
Average % - 15.7%
Average Per Child - $55
Range 10.5% to 18.6%**
*All averages exclude the I 11. 1% order












Amount of Order Income
Average Order = $79.63
Number of










Average % = 17.5%
Amount/Child
Average Per Child - $45.50
Range 5.6% to 26.7'7,.
*All averages exclude the 100.0' order
-Excluding the 100.0% order
TABLE 9
ORDERS BY SEASON OF THE YEAR
Number
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